At the hearing on confirmation of the debtor's chapter 13 plan held on April 10, 1996, the court also considered the application of counsel for the debtor for compensation and the objection of the chapter 13 trustee to the amount of compensation requested by counsel for the debtor.

The application requests allowance as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) payable as provided by 11 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) of compensation in the amount of $1,505.00 and reimbursement for expenses in the amount of $75.91.

The court agrees the amount of compensation requested is excessive and finds the objections of the chapter 13 trustee to the amount of compensation requested to be well taken.

The debtor lives in an apartment and has for the past six months or so been employed as an assistant manager at Lexmark, a local manufacturing company. His take home pay is $892 per month. His monthly expenses are shown as $692 per month, leaving disposable income of $200 per month, which he proposes to pay to the chapter 13 trustee in conformity with his chapter 13 plan.

The debtor owns no real estate. He lists as assets a 1966 Duke mobile home which he is selling to James Shelton, HC 74, Box 160, Vanceburg, Kentucky under an installment contract for $100 per month, which Mr. Shelton apparently is not paying as agreed. The mobile home, which the debtor values at $2,000, and the debtor's 1987 Mazda RX-7 automobile, which he values at $1,000, are overencumbered. The First National Bank of Lewis County has filed a proof of claim in the amount of $7,301.09 secured by a security interest in both of these motor vehicles, and a wood stove. Kentucky Finance Company has filed a proof of claim for $1,714.32 secured by a security interest (a second lien) on the mobile home and Mazda. Presumably, the 1987 Mazda is used by the debtor to commute to work and is necessary to the rehabilitation of the debtor. Obviously the mobile home and wood stove are not necessary to the rehabilitation of the debtor. It is not apparent why these items should not be surrendered to the bank as first lienholder.

Other than the aforementioned debts to First National Bank of Lewis County and Kentucky Finance Company the schedules to the petition indicate the debtor owes four creditors holding unsecured claims aggregating $893.00.

There are no debts for which codebtors are liable, no debts entitled to priority in payment, and no debts that are excepted from discharge.

Other than the mobile home, automobile, and wood stove that are overencumbered by the liens of First National Bank of Lewis County and Kentucky Finance Company the debtor lists miscellaneous personal property having a value of $225, all of which has reverted to the debtor as exempt. Under the heading "wearing apparel" the debtor lists "none," which must make him rather conspicuous in carrying on his daily activities.

It appears to the court that counsel may have done the debtor a disservice in filing for relief under chapter 13 rather than chapter 7 or, in any event, in proposing a five year plan. There is no discernible cause for extending the plan in this case beyond three years. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).

The court is persuaded that a fee of $400 will adequately compensate counsel for his services in this case. Counsel is allowed a fee of $400 and reimbursement for expenses in the amount of $75.91.

The court hopes the debtor may eventually be able to use the savings in attorney fees to buy himself some clothes.

Dated:

By the court -

_____________________________

JOE LEE, CHIEF JUDGE

Copies to:

Matthew B. Bunch, Esq.

Sidney N. White, Esq.

U.S. Trustee

Debtor

In conformity with the memorandum opinion of the court this day entered, IT IS ORDERED that counsel for the debtor is allowed a fee in the amount of $400 and reimbursement for expenses in the amount of $75.91.

On its own motion the court finds the confirmation hearing in this case is continued to 1:30 p.m., Wednesday, May 8, 1996, U.S. Bankruptcy Courtroom, 2nd Floor, Merrill Lynch Building, 100 East Vine Street, Lexington, Kentucky, for the purpose of determining whether cause exists for the court to approve extension of the debtor's proposed plan beyond three years.

Dated:

By the court -

____________________________

JOE LEE, CHIEF JUDGE

Copies to:

Matthew B. Bunch, Esq.

Sidney N. White, Esq.

U.S. Trustee

Debtor