UNITED STATES
BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR
EASTERN DISTRICT OF
KENTUCKY
COVINGTON DIVISION
IN RE:
LORRIE A. MUELLER
DEBTOR CASE NO. 04-21251
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lorrie A. Mueller (the “Debtor”)
is before the court on the objection to the allowance of the claim of Fifth
Third Bank (the “Bank”) that she filed in this case on July 15, 2004. On June
15, 2004 the Bank filed a proof of claim asserting a claim secured by the
Debtor’s residence in the amount of $30,611.50, including a mortgage arrearage
of $7,660.96. According to the objection, $3,480.72 of that sum represents
attorney’s fees allegedly incurred by the Bank. On July 29, 2004 the Bank filed
a response to the objection, attaching copies of invoices for attorney’s fees
aggregating $4,126.01. Having considered the objection and the response
thereto and the briefs and arguments of counsel, the court concludes that the
objection should be overruled.
The June 2002 invoice of the firm
of Fessler, Schneider & Grimme relates to the first attempt at foreclosure
on the Bank’s collateral, and the fees and disbursements of $804.73 are
reasonable for the title search and the preparation, filing, and service of the
complaint and lis pendens notice. The September 2002 invoice of the
Fessler firm also relates to that litigation, and the fees and disbursements of
$608.56 are reasonable for the preparation, filing, and service of a motion for
a default judgment. On September 27, 2002 the Debtor filed a voluntary
petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, commencing Case
No. 02-24456 and staying the foreclosure action.[1]
The October 2002 invoice of the
firm of McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark, LLC relates to the
2002 Chapter 13 case, and the fees and disbursements of $807.00 are reasonable
for the preparation and filing of a notice of appearance and proof of claim,
the preparation, filing, service, and prosecution of a motion for relief from
the automatic stay, a motion to dismiss the case, and an objection to confirmation
of the plan. The McCalla firm’s May 2003 invoice is for an additional fee for
the Chapter 13 case, and the additional $449.50 in fees and disbursements
appears to represent a reasonable additional sum for the services described
above. The McCalla firm’s December 2003 invoice is for an additional fee for
the Chapter 13 case, and the additional $200.00 in fees appears to represent a
reasonable additional sum for the services described above. The McCalla firm’s
February 2004 invoice appears to relate to the Chapter 13 case as well, and the
additional $250.00 fee appears to be reasonable for the preparation and filing
of a notice of default under the agreed order resolving the motion for relief
from stay. The 2002 case was dismissed at the Debtor’s request on May 5, 2004.
The Fessler firm’s March 2004
invoice relates to a second attempt at foreclosure on the Bank’s collateral,
and the fees and disbursements of $906.22 are reasonable for the title search
and preparation, filing, and the service of the complaint and lis pendens
notice. On May 13, 2004 the Debtor filed another Chapter 13 petition. The June
2004 invoice of the Fessler firm relates to that case, and the $100 fee is
reasonable for the preparation and filing of a proof of claim. The Debtor does
not dispute the propriety of the March and June 2004 invoices.
For the foregoing reasons, the
court concludes that attorney’s fees and disbursements of $4,126.01 were
properly included in the Bank’s proof of claim and are allowable.[2]
Accordingly, the court will enter a separate order overruling the Debtor’s
objection to the Bank’s claim.
Copies to:
Roger W. Howland, Esq.
Joseph F. Grimme, Esq.
Beverly M. Burden, Trustee
[1]On March 31, 1995 the Debtor and her spouse had filed
a Chapter 7 petition (No. 95-20343) and received a discharge after reaffirming
the debt to the Bank. On August 20, 2001 the Debtor and her spouse filed a
Chapter 13 petition. That case was dismissed on November 14, 2001, upon the
motion of the Chapter 13 trustee, prior to confirmation of a plan. On February
2, 2002 the Debtor and her spouse filed a second Chapter 7 petition. The
Debtors received a discharge on May 8, 2002.
[2]The Debtor’s position that the first four of five
invoices should be disallowed because the legal services related to the 2002
Chapter 13 case is not well taken because there is no evidence refuting the
Bank’s representations that none of the distributions received in that case
were applied to legal fees. The Debtor has not carried her burden of producing
evidence rebutting the prima facie validity and amount of the claim, Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 3001(f), irrespective of whether the Bank could have included some
of the invoices in a proof of claim in one or more of the Debtor’s previous
cases.